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The Problems of Divine Location and Age 
 
Abstract 
I develop two problems, which I call the problem of divine location and the problem of divine 
age, to challenge the theist belief that God created the universe. The problem of divine 
location holds that it is not clear where God existed before he created the universe. The 
problem of divine age holds that it is not clear how old God was when he created the 
universe. I explore several theist responses to these two problems, and argue that all of them 
are problematic under the existing conceptions of space and time in physics. The 
philosophical magnitudes of these two problems are equal to that of the problem of evil. 
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1. Introduction 
William Paley’s argument from design is one of the most intuitively appealing arguments for 
the existence of God (de Cruz and de Smedt, 2010). It begins with an observation about the 
world. A watch and the universe are similar in that they are both complex. They could not 
have been created of their own accord. Just as a watch was created by an intelligent designer, 
so the universe was also created by an intelligent designer. The intelligent designer of the 
watch is a human being, and the intelligent designer of the universe is God. 
The following objections have been raised against the argument from design in the 
philosophy of religion literature. Who created God? Is the analogy between a watch and the 
universe adequate? Of all the different deities that different religions worship, which deity is 
the intelligent designer who created the universe? Why did God create bad complex things, 
such as psychopaths and cancer cells? Finally, evolutionary theory has a competing account 
of why there are complex things in the world. It is not an aim of this paper to explore these 
objections. I instead only bring readers’ attention to William Rowe (2007: 54-67) for a 
summary of these objections and the replies to them. 
This paper aims to pose a new challenge to the conclusion of the argument from design 
that God created the universe. Let me call the conclusion the creation hypothesis. The more 
we think about the creation hypothesis, the more intriguing and puzzling it is. Anyone who 
embraces it should be able to answer the following two disconcerting questions. Where was 
God before he created the universe? How old was he when he created the universe? These 
two questions lead to the problems that I call the problems of divine location and age. The 
problem of divine location holds that it is not clear where God was before he created the 
universe. The problem of divine age holds that it is not clear how old God was when he 
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created the universe. Like the problem of evil in philosophy of religion, these two new 
problems present serious challenges to the theist belief that God exists. 
This paper is structured as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, I sketch and rebut several theist 
responses to the problem of divine location and to the problem of divine age, respectively, 
under the existing conceptions of space and time in physics. In Section 4, I critically evaluate 
the theist suggestion that God exists outside of space and time. In Section 5, I compare the 
problems of divine location and age with the problem of evil. It will become clear that the 
philosophical magnitudes of all these three problems are equal. Like the problem of evil, the 
problems of divine location and age have the potential to trigger voluminous debates between 
theists and atheists. 
The debates over the problems of divine location and age will throw light not only on 
the theoretical issue of whether God exists, but also on the practical issue of whether we 
should teach the argument from design in science classrooms. Some theists contend, as noted 
by many writers (Peterson, 2002; Hasker, 2009; Pennock, 2011), that the argument from 
design should replace evolutionary theory in school curricula. If the creation hypothesis is 
problematic, however, as this paper argues, then the argument from design does not deserve a 
place in science texts. 
 
2. The Problem of Divine Location 
Recall that the problem of divine location holds that it is not clear where God existed before 
he created the universe. To exist is to exist in a certain place. For example, South Korea 
exists in Asia. South Korea needs a place in order to exist. It is odd to say that South Korea 
exists but exists in no place. To say so means that it exists but does not exist. Similarly, it is 
odd to say that before God created the universe, he existed but existed in no place. To say so 
means that he existed but did not exist. So if he existed before he created the universe, he 
must have existed somewhere. Where was he located? This section aims to refute several 
possible theist responses to the problem of divine location. 
It is unconvincing that God existed in the universe before he created it. After all, it is 
not clear how God could exist in the universe, when the universe itself did not even exist. To 
say that God existed in the universe before he created it seems to involve the contradiction 
that God both existed and did not exist. 
It is also unconvincing that God existed in heaven before he created the universe. After 
all, this line of response to the problem of divine location invites further questions of the 
same kind: Who created heaven? If God did, where was he before he created heaven? So we 
are back to the problem of divine location. A moral is that any place one might name would 
be a place created by God, so any answer to the question will always return us back to the 
problem of divine location.  
Theists might suggest that our minds are finite, so we cannot know where God was 
before he created the universe. It is, however, self-defeating for theists to appeal to our 
limited cognitive capacity. After all, if we cannot know where God was due to our limited 
cognitive capacity, we should also not be able to know either that God created the universe, 
that he loves human beings, that he is omniscient, and so forth due to our limited cognitive 
capacity. To go further, if we were more intelligent than we are now, we might not believe 
that God exists. Thus, appealing to our limited cognitive capacity has the devastating 
consequence on theist beliefs. 
Theists might argue that the problem of divine location commits the fallacy of the 
loaded question. The traditional example of this fallacy is to ask someone “Have you stopped 
beating your wife?” when he has never beaten his wife before. The best thing that you can do 
when someone asks you a loaded question is to reject the question altogether, without 
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answering it, on the grounds that its presupposition is false. It follows that the best thing that 
theists can do when someone asks them “Where was God before he created the universe?” is 
to reject the question altogether, rather than answering it, on the grounds that its 
presupposition is false. The false presupposition is that there was space or something larger 
than God before he created the universe.  
What is the reason for thinking that the problem of divine location makes this false 
presupposition? Let’s go back to the example of South Korea. To ask where South Korea is 
located presupposes that there is space, or something larger than South Korea. If space or 
something larger than South Korea did not exist, we could not even ask where South Korea is 
located. Similarly, to ask where God was before he created the universe presupposes that 
there was space, or something larger than God, before he created the universe. By hypothesis, 
however, there was nothing except God before he created the universe. Therefore, the 
presupposition is false. 
Moreover, even if we cannot even talk about the location of something, that thing 
might exist. Suppose that someone asks you where the universe is located now. You would 
be at a loss for what to say. Given that the universe is all that there is, you cannot answer that 
question. Even though you cannot answer the question, the universe exists. The same point 
applies to the universe, which was smaller than a quark, approximately 14 billion years ago. 
The Big Bang theory claims that everything was tightly packed into an infinitely dense point 
called the singularity, and that the singularity expanded at incredibly high speed. Where was 
the singularity located? We cannot answer this question, given that the singularity was all that 
there was. Even so, it existed. Similarly, given that God was all that there was before he 
created the universe, we cannot answer the question of where God was before he created the 
universe. Even so, he existed. 
The preceding defense of the creation hypothesis sounds appealing, but it has a 
problem. The Big Bang theory also claims that space was created along with the big bang, 
and that there was no space prior to the birth of the universe. In the absence of space, motion 
is impossible, for motion is nothing but a change of positions in space. Thus, God could not 
even move his finger. Creating the universe is a much more daunting task than moving one’s 
finger. So if God could not even move his finger, then there is no reason for thinking that he 
could create the universe.  
 
3. The Problem of Divine Age 
Recall that the problem of divine age holds that it is not clear how old God was when he 
created the universe. This problem can be made sharp by the use of the analogy of a 
watchmaker and a watch. It seems to involve a contradiction to say that a watchmaker had 
not aged at all when he made the watch. To say that he had not aged at all indicates that he 
did not exist, and to say that he made a watch indicates that he existed. Similarly, it seems to 
involve a contradiction to say that God had not aged at all when he created the universe. To 
say that he had not aged at all indicates that he did not exist, and to say that he created the 
universe indicates that he existed. A thing begins to age at the moment it comes into 
existence. So if God existed, he must have had a nonzero age when he created the universe. 
How old was he? As we will see in this section, it is even harder to tackle the problem of 
divine age than the problem of divine location form the theist point of view. 
Theists might propose that God and the universe came into being at the same time. 
This proposal, however, is unconvincing. To say that X created Y requires the belief that X 
existed before Y. For example, to say that a watchmaker created the watch requires the belief 
that the watchmaker existed before the watch. If we believe that the watchmaker and the 
watch came into being simultaneously, we would not say that the watchmaker created the 
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watch. Analogously, if we believe that God and the universe came into being at once, we 
would not say that God created the universe. 
Theists would, however, object that the universe-maker is importantly different from 
the watchmaker. God is omnipotent while the watchmaker is not. God did not need to exist 
prior to the birth of the universe, whereas the watchmaker had to exist prior to the creation of 
the watch. On this account, God could create the universe while he himself was in the process 
of being created. 
The preceding proposal, however, has two problems. First, why should we choose the 
hypothesis that God and the universe popped into existence concurrently over the rival 
hypothesis that only the universe popped into existence? Ockham’s razor dictates us to 
choose the latter hypothesis over the former. 
Second, the Big Bang theory asserts that time was created along with the big bang. 
This assertion goes well with the Einsteinian conception of time that the flow of time depends 
upon physical processes, and hence time stops if there are no physical processes. It is an 
incoherent notion that time flew for five minutes when every physical process was frozen. 
Before the big bang, there were no physical processes, and hence time did not pass. Since 
there was no flow of time before the big bang, God must now be roughly 14 billion years old. 
This corollary does not sit well with the view that God is an eternal being, and hence that he 
was infinitely old when he created the universe. Consider that God is infinitely intelligent, 
i.e., his intelligence does not have a limit. Why would his age have a limit, when his 
intelligence does not? The asymmetry between his intelligence and age cries out for an 
explanation. 
In response, theists might reject the claim that time was created along with the big 
bang, and accept the Newtonian conception of time that time flows independently of physical 
processes, and hence that time passes even if all the physical processes stop. On the 
Newtonian account, it is a coherent notion that time passed for five minutes while every 
physical process was frozen. Since time passes independently of physical processes, an 
infinite amount of time already passed prior to the birth of the universe. Hence, God was 
infinitely old when he created the universe about 14 billion years ago. 
This theist move, however, comes at the cost of losing those who believe that a 
religious view should not rely on an obsolete scientific idea. Other things being equal, a 
religious view that is compatible with our best current scientific theories, such as the Big 
Bang theory and the general theory of relativity, is better than a competing religious view 
which is incompatible with them. For this reason, theists should operate under the Einsteinian 
framework of time. 
Theists might argue that under the Einsteinian framework of time, the problem of 
divine age commits the fallacy of the loaded question. To ask how old God was when he 
created the universe presupposes that time had passed before he created the universe. But the 
presupposition is false under the Einsteinian conception of time. So we should not ask how 
old God was. If someone asks us the question, we should reject it altogether without 
answering it. 
The Einsteinian conception of time, however, implies that God could not do anything 
prior to the birth of the universe. He could not even move his finger, for the motion of his 
finger required the lapse of time. To say that God’s finger moved up and down means that 
there was a time when his finger was up, and that there was a time when his finger was down. 
Thus, the motion of his finger implies the flow of time. Before the universe was created, 
however, there was no flow of time, and hence no motion was possible. It follows that God 
could not do anything to prepare for the birth of the universe.  
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Theists might retort that God is omnipotent, so he could create the universe even in the 
absence of the passage of time. He did not need to move his finger. He only needed to make 
up his mind to create the universe. There is a fundamental difference between moving one’s 
finger and making up one’s mind. The former is a physical event, whereas the latter is a 
mental event. A physical event cannot occur without the lapse of time, whereas a mental 
event can occur without the lapse of time.  
But is it possible for a mental event to occur without the flow of time? To say that God 
made up his mind to create the universe means that there was a time when he had not make 
up his mind and there was a time when he made up his mind. How could such change of 
God’s mental state occur without the passage of time? There was no flow of time and hence 
no change, physical and mental, up until the birth of the universe. Thus, the absence of the 
flow of time makes it a daunting task even for the omnipotent being to make up his mind to 
create the universe. 
Theists might now propose that God is a physical being, and that there are physical 
processes in his body just as there are physical processes in a human body. Since there had 
been physical processes in God’s body before he created the universe, time flew all along 
with him, he was infinitely old when he created the universe, and it was an easy task for the 
omnipotent being to create the universe. 
It is, however, objectionable that God is a physical being. If God is a physical being, he 
must be subject to the second law of thermodynamics that the entropy of an isolated system 
tends to increase, i.e., an isolated system tends to go into a disorderly state. Energy from 
outside of a system is required to keep the entropy of the system down. There was, however, 
nothing outside of God, and an infinite amount of time passed before the birth of the 
universe. So the entropy of God’s body must have been infinitely high, i.e., God must have 
been in an infinitely high degree of disorderly state before he created the universe.  
In addition, contemporary cosmology (Chen, Hsin, and Niu, 2013) claims that the 
entropy of the early universe was extremely low, and that it has been increasing ever since. 
How could God whose entropy was infinitely high create the universe whose entropy was 
extremely low? Where did all the necessary energy come from that enabled God to create the 
universe? It is wrong to say that the energy came from outside of God, for there was nothing 
but God prior to the existence of the universe. 
This objection, however, does not disprove that God, a physical being, created the 
universe. Theists could retort that God is omnipotent, so he could break the second law of 
thermodynamics, i.e., he could somehow keep the entropy of his body down without energy 
from outside. Or theists could reply that God was constantly creating the energy necessary to 
keep the entropy of his body down, and that as a result, he had enough energy to create the 
universe whose entropy was extremely low. Or they could say that God did not create the 
second law of dynamics prior to the existence of the universe. So he was free from the worry 
that the entropy of his body might increase. 
Note, however, that all these assumptions are speculative. There is no way to confirm 
or disconfirm them with observations. Furthermore, they appeal to a magical power, to the 
breach of the well-established law of nature, or to the nonexistence of a law of nature in order 
to divert an objection. Do these speculative assumptions deserve a place in science texts? 
Admittedly, they are not falsified. It is one thing, however, that they are not proved to be 
false. It is quite another that they are proved to be true. In other words, they call for 
justifications. In the absence of any justifications, we ought not to teach to our schoolchildren 
that God, whose entropy was infinitely high, managed to create the universe whose entropy 
was extremely low. 
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A more serious problem with the suggestion that God is a physical being is that it is not 
clear how any physical being could exist in the absence of space. Recall that according to the 
Big Bang theory, there was no space prior to the big bang. How could God, the physical 
being, exist prior to the existence of space? Theists might reply that God is a special being, so 
he could exist in the absence of space even though he is a physical being. Atheists, however, 
would object that if the theist reasoning is legitimate, so is the reasoning that God is a special 
being, so time did not flow even if there were physical processes in his body and time did not 
flow along with him before he created the universe. In other words, the following two 
contentions rise or fall together. 
 
(1) The physical being can exist without space. 
(2) Physical processes in God’s body can occur without the passage of time. 
 
It is wrong to say that (1) is a coherent notion whereas (2) is an incoherent notion. It follows 
that if theists endorse (1), they cannot say that God was infinitely old when he created the 
universe. 
In this section, I raised difficulties against some possible theist attempts to solve the 
problem of divine age, appealing to the Einsteinian conception of time. I must admit, though, 
that future scientists might come up with a new scientific theory replacing both the general 
theory of relativity and quantum mechanics, and that the new scientific theory might contain 
a new notion of time.
1
 If this happens, my criticisms against the possible theist responses to 
the problem of divine age will collapse. 
 
4. The Abstract World 
My objections against the creation hypothesis, sketched in the previous sections, may prod 
some theists to pursue a new strategy to the problems of divine location and age. They might 
appeal to a position called mathematical realism or platonism in philosophy of mathematics. 
I flesh out and critically examine this new strategy in this section.  
Mathematical realism asserts that mathematical objects, such as numbers, triangles, and 
functions, exist in the abstract world. So they are abstract entities. Abstract entities are 
aspatial, atemporal, non-causal, eternal, and unchanging (Balaguer, 2013). In contrast, daily 
objects, such as stones and cats, are concrete objects. Concrete objects are spatial, temporal, 
causal, ephemeral, and changing. They exist in the concrete world. The concrete world is the 
world that I have been referring to as ‘the universe’ throughout this paper. 
Examples would be useful to illustrate the distinction between abstract and concrete 
objects. It sounds counterintuitive to say, “One plus one equaled two” or “Number one exists 
here.” By contrast, it does not sound counterintuitive to say, “A cat was here. It is there 
now.” As these sentences indicate, we do not attribute temporal and spatial predicates to 
mathematical objects, although we do to concrete objects. The reason behind this linguistic 
convention is, according to mathematical realism, that mathematical objects are abstract 
objects, whereas physical objects are concrete objects. Keep in mind that mathematical 
objects exist outside of space and time, whereas physical objects exist within space and time. 
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Theists might contend that God is an abstract being, so he exists outside of space and 
time just like mathematical objects.
2
 He exists in the abstract world, even before he created 
the universe. It is illegitimate to ask how old he was when he created the universe, just as it is 
illegitimate to ask how old a triangle was. This response to the problems of divine location 
and age is compatible with both the Newtonian and the Einsteinian conceptions of time, for 
these two conceptions of time apply to the concrete world, but not to the abstract world. 
An immediate objection to the proposal that God exists in the abstract world is to ask 
who created the abstract world. So we come back to the problem of divine location. I, 
however, set this problem aside. I instead raise the following two other objections to the 
proposal.  
An abstract entity is, by its nature, non-causal. It can have a causal efficacy neither on 
another abstract entity nor on a concrete entity. It is impossible, for example, for a triangle to 
collide with a circle and move it. Nor is it possible for a triangle to collide with a stone and 
break it into pieces. If God is an abstract being, he is a non-causal being, and hence he cannot 
even move a stone. Thus, the proposal that God is an abstract being clashes with the view that 
God is omnipotent.  
Relatedly, this proposal also clashes with the creation hypothesis. To say that God 
moved a stone yesterday indicates that he is a causal being, and that he existed in space and 
time yesterday. Similarly, to say that God created the universe about 14 billion years ago 
indicates that he was a causal being, and that he existed in space and time about 14 billion 
years ago. Thus, theists have the burden of explaining how God could create the universe 
when he exists outside of space and time. 
 
5. Creation vs. No-Creation 
The creation hypothesis competes with the no-creation hypothesis that the universe is eternal. 
On the no-creation hypothesis, the universe has neither a beginning nor an end. It obeys the 
first law of thermodynamics that mass-energy can neither be created nor be destroyed. Thus, 
it is impossible for the universe to come into being or go out of being. 
The no-creation hypothesis goes hand in hand with Roger Penrose’s (2011) view that 
space and time existed before the big bang, that the universe is in the infinite cycle of 
expansion and contraction, and hence that there were and will be an infinite number of big 
bangs. Vahe Gurzadyan and Penrose (2010) claim that they have found observational data 
confirming the existence of the universe before the big bang. Their cosmological theory 
should sound agreeable to those who have metaphysical qualms about the idea that something 
can be created out of nothing. Penrose and Gurzadyan’s cosmological theory, however, is 
controversial in the contemporary physics community.  
Even if their cosmological theory is not established yet, we can ask which is better, the 
creation hypothesis or the no-creation hypothesis. Ockham’s razor enjoins us to choose the 
no-creation hypothesis over the creation hypothesis. The no-creation hypothesis postulates 
only the existence of the universe, whereas the creation hypothesis postulates the existence of 
the universe and God. The simple hypothesis is better than the complex one, ceteris paribus. 
 
6. The Problem of Evil 
The problems of divine location and age provide reasons for thinking that God did not create 
the universe. After all, if you believe that God created the universe, you owe us adequate 
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 Boethius (1962) suggested that God exists outside of time in the context in which he attempted to reconcile 
divine foreknowledge with human free will. His suggestion is also subject to the criticism that I raise in this 
section. 
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answers to the questions of where God was before he created the universe and how old he 
was when he created the universe. There is already a similar problem in philosophy of 
religion that is widely regarded as providing a reason for thinking that God does not exist. It 
is the problem of evil. This section aims to explicate and compare it with the problems of 
divine location and age. 
The problem of evil holds that it is not clear why evil exists if God exists. Evil is 
anything that causes suffering. Crimes and natural disasters are some examples of evil. God 
is omniscient, omnipotent, and benevolent. So he knows that evil exists, he has the power to 
destroy evil, and he loves the victims of evil. It is not clear why he does not stop or eliminate 
evil. There are several theist responses to the problem of evil and atheist rebuttals in the 
philosophy of religion literature. This paper need not explore them. I only call interested 
readers’ attention to Theodore Schick, Jr. and Lewis Vaughn (2010: 508-522) for a summary 
of the theist responses and the atheist rebuttals.  
The problem of evil is so important that any introductory philosophy text addresses it. 
In my view, the philosophical magnitudes of the problems of divine location and age are 
equal to that of the problem of evil. The only relevant difference between them is that the 
problems of divine location and age challenge the existence of God prior to the birth of the 




I have developed the problems of divine location and age, and then defused several possible 
theist attempts to solve them. Like the problem of evil, however, they remain as strikes 
against the theist belief that God exists. The future debates over them can be, I believe, as 
voluminous as the debates over the problem of evil, casting light on the relationship between 
the existence of the universe and the (alleged) existence of God.  
The various contentions that theists and atheists will advance in those debates should 
be accepted or rejected, I proposed, depending on whether they meet epistemic standards that 
scientific hypotheses in science texts meet, for some theists claim, as we noted in the 
introduction of this paper, that the argument from design should replace evolutionary theory 
in science classrooms. Thus, to put forward a merely speculative assumption should not count 
as a defense of the creation hypothesis that God created the universe. 
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